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ARTICLES
The Resale Royalty Provisions of the




On August 6, 1987, Senator Kennedy introduced the Visual
Artists Rights Act,' a proposed amendment to the present Copyright
* Associate, Alder Cohen & Grigsby, P.C., Pittsburgh, Pa.; B.A. 1981, Swarthmore Col-
lege; M.A. 1985, University of North Carolina; J.D. 1987, University of Michigan. The author
thanks Pam Wiles, Tom Marshall and Charles Cohen for their comments and encouragement,
and Kathy Mott for her help preparing the manuscript.
1. S. 1619, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 Cong. Rec. S 11,471-01 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1987).
The Bill is currently before the Senate Judiciary Committee. In addition to a resale royalty,
the Visual Artists Rights Act, which is cosponsored by Senator Kasten, proposes that fine
artists be exempt from the notice requirements of the Copyright Act. S. 1619, 100th Cong.,
Ist Sess. § 5 (1987). It also provides a "moral right" for visual artists. The "moral right"
allows an artist to claim authorship in any of his or her works which are publicly displayed or
to disclaim authorship in any works which undergo substantial alteration. S. 1619, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess., § 3(b)(1). Additionally, the "moral right" allows the artist to enjoin "the
significant or substantial distortion, mutilation, or other alteration" of his or her work. S. 1619,
100th Cong., 1st Sess., § 3(c)(1). The moral right remains with the artist even if the work or
any of the exclusive copyrights have been transferred.
Both the moral right and the resale royalty developed in France. A history of the moral
right and a discussion of its common law analogues are provided by Roeder, The Doctrine of
Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors, and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554
(1940) and by Comment, Toward Artistic Integrity: Implementing Moral Right Through Ex-
tension of Existing American Legal Doctrines, 60 GEo. L.J. 1539 (1972).
Unlike the Kennedy proposal, which provides moral rights only to authors of pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural work, most commentators believe the moral right should apply to all
sorts of works including novels and plays as well as painting and sculpture. See Note, An
Author's Artistic Reputation Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 92 HARv. L. REV. 1490
(1979), which argues that the Copyright Act's grant of control over derivative works to the
copyright holder found in 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1978), provides authors and artists with a de
facto moral right.
The present Visual Artists Rights Act is a re-introduction of the Visual Arts Rights
Amendment, S. 2927, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). Senator Kennedy introduced the Rights
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Act," and once again brought to public attention the idea of a resale
royalty right for visual artists. The Kennedy Bill would empower the
Copyright Office to monitor a system which provides artists with 7
percent of the profits each time one of their works is resold for at
least $1000 and at a profit of at least 150 percent.3 The resale roy-
alty has a long history both in the United States and abroad, and
was first introduced in late nineteenth century France and enacted
there as the droit de suite in 1921." The French legislation was in-
tended to benefit starving artists or their families who had fallen
upon hard times, but whose work fetched phenomenal prices when
auctioned by wealthy collectors.5 After France enacted the droit de
suite, several other countries adopted similar legislation, and the re-
sale royalty now exists in Algeria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France,
West Germany, Italy, Morocco, Poland, Portugal, Turkey, Tunisia,
Uruguay and Yugoslavia. 6
In the United States, the resale royalty first surfaced in 1948
with regard to Grant Wood's painting, Daughters of the American
Revolution.7 Shortly after Wood sold this painting to a dealer, the
dealer resold the work for four times his original purchase price. An-
gered by this experience, Wood vowed that subsequent sales of his
work would include a contractual stipulation that he receive 50 per-
cent of the profits each time the work was resold.
The movement for a legislative rather than a contractual resale
royalty, an attempt to avoid the problems of bargaining power and
privity associated with contract,8 began in the United States with the
Amendment on September 9, 1986, but no action was taken on the proposed bill before the
Ninety-Ninth Congressional session ended. The Bill was then retitled and re-introduced to the
One-Hundredth Congress. Except for minor changes, the two bills are the same. This essay
was written with the assumption that comments made about the Rights Amendment apply
equally to the Rights Act.
2. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1978).
3. S. 1619, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 3(d)(l), (2) (1987).
4. A history of the droit de suite is provided in Hauser, The French Droit de Suite: The
Problem of Protection for the Under-privileged Artist Under the Copyright Law, I I Copy-
RIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) I, 5-7 (1962).
5. One story is that Millet's widow sold flowers on the street in order to subsist while her
late husband's paintings brought their sellers vast sums at auction. Hauser, supra note 4, at I.
6. Schulder, Art Proceeds Act: A Study of the Droit de Suite and a Proposed Enact-
ment for the United States, 61 Nw. L. REV. 19, 22 n.13 (1966). See Goetzl and Sutton,
Copyright and the Visual Artist's Display Right: A New Doctrinal Analysis, 9 COLUM. J. L.
& ARTS 15, 37 (1984).
7. Grant Wood Paints George Washington and Cherry Tree, LIFE, Feb. 19, 1948.
8. One argument that contractual royalties are insufficient is that artists lack the bar-
gaining power to get royalty clauses into contracts. Younger artists in particular will give up
the chance for a resale royalty in order to make an initial sale. For a discussion of this problem
and of others associated with a contractual royalty, see Note, A Proposal for National Uni-
form Art-Proceeds Legislation, 53 IND. L.J. 129, 134 (1978).
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publication of a few law review articles in the late 1950s and early
1960s, during the revision of the 1909 Copyright Act.9 These arti-
cles, however, had little influence on the Copyright Revision Com-
mission, and not until 1973, when the taxicab magnate and art col-
lector Robert Scull auctioned off an assemblage by Robert
Rauschenberg entitled Thaw, was resale royalty legislation intro-
duced at the federal or state level.10 Scull purchased Thaw in 1958
for $900, then sold the work at auction in 1973 for $85,000. 11 Much
to his chagrin, Rauschenberg received none of the resale profits. The
Scull affair was widely reported"' and, in the five years that fol-
lowed, resale royalty bills were introduced in Congress,1 by Repre-
sentative Waxman, and in the California1 4 and Ohio1" state legisla-
tures. Only the California bill, which provides artists a royalty of five
percent of the gross resale price, was passed into law. Although Rep-
resentative Waxman's bill stirred law review comment, it died in
Committee. 6
The present impetus underlying the introduction of Senator
Kennedy's Visual Artists Rights Act is unclear. California's resale
royalty law has been largely unused, and has not stimulated any par-
ticular art activity in that state. 17 Also, nothing resembling the
Rauschenberg/Scull affair has erupted in the art world recently to
have prompted Senator Kennedy's proposal. Instead, the Visual Art-
ists Rights Act may indicate the increasing power which the arts
have gained in the legal community during the past fifteen years.
For example, one proponent of the pending Act is the New York
9. Hauser, whose article was submitted to the 1958 Copyright Law Symposium, and
Schulder, were among the first commentators to urge the adoption of resale royalty legislation
in the United States. See supra notes 4 and 6.
10. See Hughes, A Modest Proposal: Royalties for Artists, TIME, Mar. 11, 1974, at 65.
11. Id.
12. Id. Shortly after Thaw was auctioned, Rauschenberg confronted Scull and the two
engaged in heated argument. Perhaps this confrontation, in addition to Scull's high profit mar-
gin, explains the press coverage and wide advocacy which the resale royalty gained in the
1970s.
13. H.R. 11403, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
14. CAL. Civ. CODE § 987 (Deering 1986).
15. H.B. 808, 112th General Assembly, Regular Sess., §§ 3379.10-.23 (Ohio 1977).
This bill is reproduced in Note, Artists' Resale Royalties Legislation. Ohio House Bill 808
and a Proposed Alternative, 9 TOL. L. REV. 366, 375 n.39 (1978).
16. Solomon & Gill, Federal and State Resale Royalty Legislation 'What Hath Art
Wrought?', 26 UCLA L. REV. 322 (1978). The authors provide the most extensive discussion
of Representative Waxman's bill.
17. McInerney, California Resale Royalties Act: Private Sector Enforcement, 19
U.S.F.L. REV. 1, 3 (1984); Visual Artists Rights Amendments of 1986: Hearing before the
Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 106 (1986)
[hereinafter Hearing on Proposed 1986 Amendment] (statement of Ronald Feldman). Both
Mclnerney and Feldman note the moribund state of California's royalty law.
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Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts (VLA).' 8 This group was founded
by four lawyers in 1969 and is now a nationwide organization com-
posed of lawyers from several prestigious law firms. 9 The successful
growth of the VLA may have brought artists' interests into the legal
mainstream, and Senator Kennedy's proposal may signify the suc-
cess of artists' lawyers, rather than of artists. After all, lawyers, not
artists, draft legislation and lobby Congress.
Whatever the reasons for its existence, the Visual Artists Rights
Act ostensibly was introduced in order to further "one of [Congress']
most important responsibilities[:] to provide an environment which
will promote the arts and enhance our cultural heritage."2 Whether
the Kennedy Bill would achieve this goal is debatable. Indeed, a look
at the present art market indicates that enactment of a resale royalty
will not affect the amount of activity in that market. What enact-
ment of the proposed Bill's resale royalty provisions may do, how-
ever, is provide a governmental definition of fine art applicable to
every creative endeavor, whether or not that endeavor is publicly
sponsored. Rather than promote aesthetic development, enactment of
a resale royalty right, of the Visual Artists Rights Act generally,
may hinder artistic experimentation or crystallize the idea that there
is an essential difference between fine and popular art, the former of
value to our cultural heritage, the latter but a passing of our collec-
tive fancy.
II. Arguments in Support of the Royalty
Proponents of the resale royalty, who predominantly have been
lawyers, politicians, and some artists, though not art historians or art
dealers, share a view of the artist, of his or her work, and of the art
world.2" Although rarely stated explicitly, advocates of a legislative
royalty subscribe to a romantic view of the artist, a view which ini-
18. 133 CONG. REC. S11502 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1987); 132 CONG. REC. S12185 (daily
ed. Sept. 9, 1986).
19. Annual Report Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, 1982-83/1983-84 (R. Luger ed.
1985) outlines the successful growth of this organization.
20. 132 CONG. REC. S12185 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1986).
21. Senator Kennedy states that his proposal has the support of "artists, art historians,
art lawyers, [and] art dealers," 133 CONG. REC. S11502 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1987). Art histori-
ans who spoke at the hearings on the Visual Arts Rights Amendment, however, mentioned
only the moral right provisions of the bill and said nothing about the resale royalty. Hearing
on Proposed 1986 Amendment, supra note 17, (statements of Rosalind Kraus, City University
of New York and Irving Sandier, State University of New York). Art dealers are vehemently
opposed to the royalty. See Visual Artists Rights Act of 1987: Hearing Before the Judiciary
Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. , -
(1987) [hereinafter Hearing on Proposed 1987 Act] (statements of Michael Ainslie, Sotheby's
Holding Company and R. Frederick Woolworth, President, Art Dealers Association).
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tially developed in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
According to romantic theory, the truth or value of an artwork
springs from the special qualities of the artist who impresses upon
the work a measure of his or her genius. In recognition of this ge-
nius, or of the truths to which this genius points, lay people experi-
ence aesthetic enjoyment."" The artist J.S.G. Boggs, who was re-
cently acquitted of charges of "reproducing" British currency, nicely
summarized the romantic conception and illustrated its contempo-
rary viability. Upon his arrest, Boggs stated: "It is my job to allow
my thoughts and feelings to be expressed and communicated through
visual work of my hands. For art to be true and just and honest, I
must allow my inner self out."'3 The idea that the artist's inner qual-
ities are most important is also expressed in Massachusetts' moral
right statute, which provides that "fine art . . . is an expression of
the artist's personality.""'
The romantic theorist would argue that society benefits from its
artists because most people are conventional or dull and need the
artist to point out elements of beauty and originality and to spur
them out of their docile acceptance of social norms and values.," For
example, artists of the "ash-can school"' portrayed Oriental and
East European immigrants in a form and manner previously reserved
for representations of the business, political, or social elite. They did
this at a time when many Americans advocated a national eugenics
policy and when most people tacitly accepted the concept of a hier-
22. The first two chapters of M.H. ABRAMS, THE MIRROR AND THE LAMP: ROMANTIC
THEORY AND THE CRITICAL TRADITION (1953), survey the development of the romantic model
in all the arts. R. SHIFF, CEZANNE AND THE END OF IMPRESSIONISM (1985), surveys application
of this model to the visual arts in the nineteenth century. The final section of Shiff's book
applies to contemporary artworks.
23. Weschler, Onward and Upward with the Arts: Value - Category Confusion, THE
NEW YORKER, Jan. 25, 1988, at 95. The artists who spoke at the subcommittee hearing on the
Visual Artists Rights Act also made statements supporting the contemporary viability of the
romantic model. Jenny Holzer summarized the artistic process in the following manner:
"Maybe it is not too romantic to say that artists go as deeply as they can to find what is best
in themselves. Then they try to make external what they find. The result is a work of art."
Hearing on Proposed 1987 Act, supra note 21, at - (statement of Jenny Holzer, artist).
Ms. Holzer's statement, which is consistent with romantic theory, suggests that the valuable
part of an artwork springs from within the artist.
24. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S (West Supp. 1985).
25. See generally M.H. ABRAMS, supra note 22, and R. SHIFF, supra note 22.
26. The term "ash-can school" describes a group of American painters active during the
first decades of this century. They painted immigrants and urban alleyways as well as portraits
of the socially prominent. Robert Henri, John Sloan, William Glackens, Ernst Lawson, George
Luks, and Everett Shinn were among the group's most prominent members. Examples of their
work are illustrated throughout B. PERLMAN, THE IMMORTAL EIGHT: AMERICAN PAINTING
FROM THOMAS EAKINS TO THE ARMORY SHOW, 1870-1913 (1979).
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archy of races which placed the Anglo-Saxon race at the top.2"
Viewers confronted with an ash-can painting were forced to question
a plethora of preconceived ideas, such as what the appropriate sub-
jects are for an artist, how such subjects should be represented, and
what sort of experience (pleasurable, instructive, or political) an art-
work should induce. Their preconceptions challenged, viewers of ash-
can work were potentially enriched, or improved, after consideration
and contemplation of the work.28
For the romantic theorist, however, political or social commen-
tary is not the singular or even a necessary element in a work of
aesthetic merit. If the artist were simply a social commentator, the
quality of his or her work would be linked to the moral value of its
narrative message, and the artist would be like an opinion or edito-
rial columnist. The romantic conception envisions the artist as some-
one who, unlike the ordinary person, can recognize truth or beauty
and can create beautiful objects or aesthetic experiences. 9 The
forms which the artist creates, therefore, are as much an element of
his or her art, as any social or political message.
For instance, in Fragonard's eighteenth century painting, The
New Model there is no overt social or political theme. At first
glance, the painting seems to be a straightforward representation of
an artist before his easel, with a female model and her chaperone
positioned at different points in the studio. The lack of overt moral
content challenged established eighteenth century academic theory
which, through the hierarchy of genres, held that history paintings,
illustrations of historical and morally significant events, were of the
highest value.30 As one commentator points out, however, what
avant-garde eighteenth century art patrons wanted were paintings
which "revealed the progress of [the artist's] creative genius and al-
lowed [the patron] to vicariously experience artistic inspiration.131
In The New Model, Fragonard reveals his creative genius by
27. J. HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM (1955)
discusses several racial theories current in early twentieth century America.
28. This aspect of ash-can art is discussed in chapters 8 and 9 of W.I. HOMER, ROBERT
HENRI AND His CIRCLE (1969). See also R. Henri, THE ART SPIRIT (M. Ryerson ed. 1960).
29. Roger Fry described the artist as someone who sees the world in a different way
than does the ordinary person. See R. FRY, The Artist's Vision, in VISION AND DESIGN 47
(1924). See also HENRI, supra note 28, passim.
30. P. CONISBEE, PAINTING IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY FRANCE (1981) discusses eight-
eenth century academic theory in the first chapter. This theory ranked paintings according to a
hierarchy of genres: history painting, portraiture, genre painting, still life, and landscape. A
genre's place in the hierarchy depended upon what message about the human condition paint-
ings of that genre conveyed.
31. Sheriff, For Love or Money? - Rethinking Fragonard, 19 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
STUDIES 333, 345 (Spring 1986).
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leaving his brushstrokes visible, an indication of his touch (an auto-
graph), and by making elements of form and content correspond.
Male figures are executed in hard lines, female figures with more
fluid ones; simple shapes such as the easel are contrasted with com-
plex ones such as drapery folds.3 2 This arrangement of color and
form reveals the artist's conscious manipulation of the composition
and indicates the degree of Fragonard's talent. He represents the
world in a manner which seems natural (or photographic), but
which, upon reflection, indicates control. A viewer who recognizes
Fragonard's compositional power becomes more aware of the visual
world and of the process of making a representation of that world. In
this way, the artist/genius improves the viewer and allows the viewer
to see. 33
An alternative view to the romantic conception envisions the
artist as a craftsperson whose work functions as a conduit for truths
originating from sources other than within the artist.3 4 For example,
in a painting of the Crucifixion or in a portrait of a political leader,
such as Rigaud's Louis XI V,35 the most important aspect of the work
is not how beautifully it is painted or what the artist may think, but
rather the "extra-aesthetic" meanings which the artist has been in-
structed to represent: fundamental tenets of Christianity or certain
assertions about the quality of the French government. In these ex-
amples, the artist conveys the ideas of someone else, and those ideas,
not the artist's inspiration, give the work its value. According to this
view, a painting or sculpture is only slightly different from any other
object which is made to order, such as a magazine advertisement,
handcrafted bookshelves, or dining room furniture. The artist/craft-
sperson does not impart to the work a spiritual quality, but rather a
32. Sheriff, supra note 31. Sheriff includes an illustration of The New Model. Id. at 347.
33. Id. at 345. See also R. FRY, supra note 29 (explaining that one of the artist's func-
tions is to better enable others to see and appreciate nature).
Fragonard is a useful example since he came at the beginning of the romantic (or mod-
ern) movement and, at least in part, worked against a governmental standard (i.e. against
those academic values embodied in the hierarchy of genres). As Boggs' above quoted state-
ment indicates, however, the romantic conception of the artist/genius remains valid today and
may be applied to abstract works. See supra text accompanying note 23. For example, first
generation abstract expressionists Adolph Gottleib and Mark Rothko have explained that
through the arrangement of color and form, their works express "the impact of elemental
truth" and that "it is our function as artists to make the spectator see the world our way -
not his way." See AMERICAN ART 1700-1960 210 (J. McCoubrey ed. 1965). Whether the
artist is Fragonard or Rothko, the romantic theorist emphasizes that what is most important
about the artwork comes from within the artist.
34. M.H. ABRAMS, supra note 22, discusses alternatives to the romantic model in Chap-
ter one.
35. Rigaud's portrait of the French monarch is reproduced in P. CONISBEE, supra note
30, at 116 (1981).
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degree of technical competence, the sort of thing expected from any
well-trained and hardworking individual.
The romantic view of art has been predominant for the past sev-
eral centuries, and the resale royalty logically follows from this view.
The qualities which the artist impresses upon his or her work never
leave it, and whenever the work changes hands, any enjoyment
which the new owner derives is solely attributable to the artist. Since
the artist is responsible for the enjoyment of subsequent owners, he
or she should collect a fee or royalty when the work is resold. 6
The idea that the artist is responsible for each owner's aesthetic
enjoyment and should, therefore, benefit financially every time a
work is resold, is not the only argument asserted by proponents of
the resale royalty. Developing another aspect of romantic theory,
that great artwork rarely is recognized until some time after its crea-
tion, proponents claim that artworks sell initially for less than their
true value.87 Two explanations are offered to account for the low ini-
tial prices. First, young unknown artists have little bargaining power
and must sell their work at any price in order to survive.3" Second,
since popular vision and taste lags behind that of the avant garde,
buyers necessarily undervalue new work.39 Although a collector may
have offered a higher price if he or she had recognized the work's
actual value, such recognition is rare, and due to their lack of bar-
gaining power, artists must accept low prices for new work. Advo-
cates of the resale royalty argue that artworks are more accurately
valued at later sales, when community taste has progressed, and that
the royalty redresses the loss suffered by the artist at the initial
sale."'
Proponents of the resale royalty also argue that due to the na-
ture of the various media of the several arts, present American law
36. See Goetzl & Sutton, supra note 6, at 49-53 (arguing that each time a work is
resold it is redisplayed or re-experienced and that a resale royalty is merely an expansion of
the display right granted in 17 U.S.C. § 106(5)).
How the royalty should be calculated is a subject for debate: the Visual Artists Rights
Act proposes a royalty of seven percent of the profits; California's statute provides a royalty of
five percent of the resale price; Grant Wood sought a 50 percent royalty in his contractual
stipulations; another alternative, perhaps the one most consistent with romantic theory, is a
100 percent royalty less the seller's conservation costs.
37. Sherman, Incorporation of the Droit de suite into United States Copyright Law, 18
COPYRIGHT L. SyMP (ASCAP) 50, 56 (1970). Schulder, supra note 6, at 22. Hearing on
Proposed 1987 Act, supra note 21, at - (statement of Robert Mangold, artist).
38. Note, supra note 8, at 134.
39. Hauser, supra note 4, at 1. Hearing on Proposed 1987 Act, supra note 21, at
(statement of Robert Mangold, artist).
40. Note, supra note 15, at 366. Hearing on Proposed 1987 Act. supra note 21, at -
(statement of Robert Mangold, artist).
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favors writers and composers over visual artists.4 ' The important ele-
ments of a novel or musical score are not limited to any particular
copy of the work, but subsist in every copy. Recognizing this fact,
copyright law provides authors and composers with a royalty each
time a copy of their work is sold (i.e., the Copyright Act provides
writers and musicians the power to bargain for such a royalty). The
visual artist's dilemma is that originals or limited editions are more
valuable than mass reproductions, and, as a result of the first sale
doctrine,'2 copyright law fails to provide the visual artist with ade-
quate protection or remuneration. The visual artist receives few roy-
alties from the sale of copies since copies are rarely made, and paint-
ers and sculptors should instead collect a royalty whenever an
original is resold.'
Proponents of the royalty recognize that the number of success-
ful artists is small and incidents of resale are rare. The single empiri-
cal study of the resale art market estimated that only 0.15 percent of
all living American artists had a significant number of their works
resold." Although few artists would benefit from a resale royalty,
proponents argue that the size or activity of the resale art market is
not an issue. Successful artists, whose works are much desired and
who have contributed to the quality of American life and to the
country's cultural heritage, should benefit from their success. Propo-
nents contend that even if the resale royalty would benefit but a sin-
gle artist, the royalty provided by the Visual Artists Rights Act is
worthwhile since it is the artist's talent or genius which has provided
aesthetic enjoyment to the initial owner, and to all subsequent
owners.'
5
III. Arguments Against the Royalty
Opponents of the resale royalty, who generally favor govern-
41. Senator Kennedy made this point when he introduced the Visual Artists Rights Act,
133 CONG. REC. S11502 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1987). See also Hauser, supra note 4, at I;
Schulder, supra note 6, at 34; Sherman, supra note 37, at 56; Solomon and Gill, supra note
16, at 352.
42. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1978).
43. See sources cited supra note 41.
44. Camp, Art Resale Rights and the Art Resale Market: An Empirical Study, 28
BULL. CR. SOC. 146, 152 (1980). Camp's figures on living artists are significant since Senator
Kennedy's proposal grants the royalty to the artist and his or her heirs for a period of the
artist's life plus fifty years. S. 1619, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(d)(1). An interesting study
would be to compare the artists whom Camp identifies as having a substantial number of
works resold with those who often have reproductions of their works sold, e.g., as posters or
post-cards. The latter group is sufficiently successful commercially to benefit from present
copyright laws. It may be that both groups consist of primarily the same people.
45. Mclnerney, supra note 17, at 8.
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ment support for the arts, have about as many arguments as do the
royalty's advocates. Opponents' arguments, which are primarily of
two types, either attack particular provisions of a royalty proposal as
ill-conceived or poorly drafted," or claim that "the establishment of
resale royalties, far from helping artists or having only a neutral ef-
fect, would in fact be positively harmful to their interests. ' 7 Argu-
ments of the second type speak more powerfully against the proposed
Act since the drafters of the Act have corrected many of the techni-
cal deficiencies found in earlier royalty proposals.48 Rather than con-
sider an artist's intrinsic right to benefit from the resale of his or her
work, opponents of the royalty consider its effects on the art world
generally and conclude that the benefits which might accrue to a few
artists would not outweigh the harms which would be suffered by
many others.
Art collectors, opponents of the royalty claim, purchase art ob-
jects not only for aesthetic satisfaction, but also for investment pur-
poses.4 9. Since a royalty diminishes the investor's profit when an art-
work is resold, if a royalty were enacted, the investment-minded
collector would buy a commodity free of the resale royalty, rather
than purchase a painting or sculpture and support a needy young
artist. If a collector purchased a work of art, the royalty would be
considered at the time of the initial sale, and the investor's offer di-
minished by the present value of the anticipated royalty.50 Since the
artist has no bargaining power, he or she would have to accept this
low offer. The effect of the resale royalty then would be to decrease
both the number and the price of initial purchases. Fewer artists
would sell fewer works and our artistic heritage would suffer.
Opponents of the royalty also note that art dealers, whose gal-
leries are the primary places where new talent is brought to public
attention, incur high costs when they organize exhibitions. Rarely do
46. See infra note 48.
47. Weil, Resale Royalties: Nobody Benefits, 77 ARTNEWS, Mar. 1978, at 58.
48. Kathryn L. Boe points out that the five percent royalty allowed under California's
resale royalty statute applies to all sales in excess of $1,000, provided that the resale price is
higher than the initial purchase price. If a painting is purchased for $50,000 and later sold for
$51,000, the royalty is $2,550 and far exceeds the seller's pre-royalty profit. Note, The Droit
de Suite Has Arrived: Can It Thrive in California as It Has in Calais?, II CREIGHTON L.
REV. 529, 540 (1978). This situation, which seems unfair to the seller, is remedied in the
Kennedy Bill. In the Visual Artists Rights Act, the royalty applies only to the seller's profits
and then only if the selling price exceeds the purchase price by 150 percent. S.1619, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess., § 3(d)(I), (2) (1987).
49. Weil, supra note 47, at 61.
50. An economic analysis of the effect a resale royalty would have on the art market is
provided by Bloch, Damon & Hinshaw, An Economic Analysis of the California Art Royalty
Statute, 10 CONN. L. REV. 689 (1978).
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exhibitions pay for themselves. Usually, the costs of a show, includ-
ing promotion expenses and gallery overhead, far exceed the amount
received from the sale of exhibited works.5 1 Dealers support them-
selves and underwrite the expenses of the exhibitions through "back
room" sales, which are the resales of works by well-known, long-
established artists.5 ' If the resale royalty is enacted, profits from
back room sales would diminish and fewer unknown artists would
receive front room exhibition space.53 In this way, too, the resale roy-
alty would hinder the development of new artistic talent.
Opponents of the resale royalty make one final practical argu-
ment. Young artists, they contend, are the ones who need financial
support and the resale royalty would benefit only a few well-estab-
lished individuals who have already achieved financial success."
Rather than waste time and money in the pursuit of a resale royalty,
why not lobby for some other sort of art support legislation? Only
from time to time do congressmen attend to the art world; when
their attention is so turned, why not advocate more meaningful sup-
port measures?55
IV. The Relationship Between the Royalty and Contemporary Art
Theory
Passion rather than reason has fueled the longstanding debate
over the resale royalty and the single empirical study of the resale
art market suggests that many of the claimed beneficial or detrimen-
tal effects associated with the royalty are without sound basis.5 In
his empirical study of the art resale market, Tom R. Camp found
that 107,476 men and women identified their occupation as artist in
the 1970 census; presumably, this identification indicates that these
51. Elsen, The Arts Bills: Plusses and Minuses, 76 ARTNEWS 52, Oct. 1977, at 54.
52. Solomon & Gill, supra note 16, at 342-43.
53. Id.
54. Elsen, supra note 51, at 54. Elsen sheds few tears for Robert Rauschenberg who, as
the Scull auction demonstrates, is one of the handful of artists the resale royalty would benefit:
Artists now substantially benefit from profitable resale of their art because of the
positive effect it has on the fair market value of their unsold and future work.
Rauschenberg doesn't own part of an island off the Florida coast and pay taxes
that outstrip the income of most artists because he was exploited and denied the
benefits of the capitalist system.
Id.
55. Weil, supra note 47, at 62, and Price, Government Policy and Economic Security
for Artists: The Case of the Droit de Suite, 77 YALE L.J. 1333, 1352 (1968), suggest various
other forms of art support legislation. One alternative is percentage-for-the-arts legislation
which allocates a percentage of the building costs in federally funded architectural projects for
artwork.
56. See Camp, supra note 44.
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people were able to support themselves as studio art teachers or
through sales of their artworks." Of those more than one hundred
thousand individuals, only 65 had two or more works resold at auc-
tion between 1973 and 1977.58 Similarly, in 1974 art critic Robert
Hughes stated that "every year the U.S. art education system cranks
out more than 30,000 graduates, each with a degree saying 'artist;'
there is a glut of talent."59
The figures provided by Camp and Hughes suggest that the re-
sale royalty provisions of the Visual Artists Rights Act would have
no appreciable economic effect on the art world or on the art market.
The royalty would help only a handful of artists, and, since most
galleries operate without the benefit of reselling works by artists such
as Jaspar Johns or Robert Rauschenberg, the small profit decline
which the royalty would cause in a few galleries probably would not
alter the type of artist which most galleries exhibit. 0 While its mar-
ket effects are likely minimal, the resale royalty raises other issues
that, so far, both proponents and opponents of the measure have ad-
dressed only tangentially: whether the resale royalty involves a right
properly enacted as a part of United States copyright law; and, since
any royalty system cannot operate without a definition of "work of
fine art," whether it is appropriate for the government to provide
such a definition.
A. The Royalty and Copyright Theory
Congress enacted the Copyright Act with the powers granted in
article I, section 8 of the Constitution, which provides that "[tIhe
Congress shall have the power . . . to promote the progress of sci-
ence and the useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discover-
ies." 1 Although never expressly mentioned, the general public rather
than the author, was the intended beneficiary of the constitutional
57. Camp, supra note 44, at 152. The figure for the 1980 census was 146,144. U.S.
DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1980 CENSUS OF THE POPULATION: SUBJECT
REPORTS - OCCUPATION BY INDUSTRY, Table 4.
58. Camp, supra note 44, at 152. Camp was unable to obtain information about private
or gallery sales. Id.
59. Hughes, supra note 10, at 66.
60. Camp, supra note 44, at 152-53, explains that "approximately 16% of the artists
were responsible for about 77% of the total value of resales" and that the works of five artists
(Jaspar Johns, Robert Rauschenberg, Willem de Kooning, Alexander Calder, and Frank
Stella) accounted for almost one-third of the total value of all resales. The vast majority of
galleries, however, do not handle works by these artists. It is hard to believe, therefore, that
most galleries support themselves through "back room" resales.
61. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8.
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provision." A grant of control over his or her work provides an au-
thor some economic incentive to create. Only printers authorized by
the author may produce copies of the author's work and the author
may contract to share in the profits from the sale of copies as a con-
dition of authorization. The public is the ultimate beneficiary of this
arrangement since the economic incentive spurs authors to produce
and publish more work, and more information flows to the
community."
Neither the statistics developed by Robert Hughes and Tom R.
Camp,64 nor the several arguments put forth by resale royalty propo-
nents," indicate that the royalty would benefit the public or that it
would operate consistently with the purposes of American copyright
law. The number of artists and artworks produced in the United
States grows daily, and this country is an important center for inter-
national art. The proponents of the resale royalty consistently argue
that a particular artist has not received what is rightfully his or hers;
not that the public is aesthetically deprived or that artists need an
incentive to create." The fact that proponents' arguments place the
interests of the artist before those of the public is consistent with
romantic theory. In this instance, however, that theory does not
mesh with the purposes of American copyright law.
Proponents may argue, however, that enactment of a royalty is
consistent with American copyright law since a royalty would fur-
62. The purposes and policies of the U.S. copyright laws are discussed in LATMAN,
GORMAN, & GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE EIGHTIES 11-19 (2d ed. 1981). The authors in-
clude an explanation of the reasons why the general public is considered to be the intended
beneficiary of those laws.
63. That the general public, and not the writer or artist, was the intended beneficiary of
the copyright clause has long been recognized. In Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954), the
Supreme Court, citing earlier cases, made just this point:
"The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a
secondary consideration." ... However, it is "intended definitely to grant valua-
ble, enforceable rights to authors, publishers, etc., without burdensome require-
ments; 'to afford greater encouragement of the production of literary [or artistic]
works of lasting benefit to the world.'"...
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant
patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort
by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of
authors and inventors ....
Id. at 219 (citations omitted).
64. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
65. See generally supra notes 21-45 and accompanying text.
66. Goetzl & Sutton, supra note 6, at 17-57, who support enactment of resale royalty
legislation, do argue that present copyright law provides little or no incentive for visual artists
to create and that the royalty right is such an incentive. Nonetheless, Goetzl and Sutton, along
with other advocates of the royalty, primarily view the royalty as an artist's right rather than
as an economic incentive designed to promote aesthetic activity and ultimately to benefit the
general public.
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ther encourage aesthetic activity in the United States. Enactment of
a resale royalty would show a national commitment to the arts,
would add prestige to the artist's profession, and would make that
profession more attractive to young people. Indeed, when Senator
Kennedy introduced the initial version of the Visual Artists Rights
Act to the Senate he made a similar argument by stating, "[tihe bill
recognizes the intrinsic value of our cultural heritage and the need to
sustain an environment in America, which nurtures that heritage
. .. [And it is intended] 'to further the appreciation of culture
among all people, to increase respect for the creative individual.' "
Notwithstanding these salutary words, from its first enactment in
France in 1921, the resale royalty has always been discussed in
terms of a benefit for the artist. Any unforeseen public gain would
be but a welcome bonus and this point, along with the generally rec-
ognized purpose of American copyright law, requires consideration
before a visual artists resale royalty is added to the Copyright Act.
B. The Royalty and Art Theory
Another, more troublesome problem presented by Senator Ken-
nedy's Bill, and by all previous royalty proposals, relates to the ad-
ministrative agency needed to make the royalty a practical success
and the definition of fine art which that agency must promulgate and
apply to works submitted for registration.6" The success of the roy-
alty system in France is attributable to the presence of such an ad-
ministrative agency, one which registers works of fine art, monitors
sales, and collects and distributes royalties. 9 The absence of such an
agency is cited to explain the under-used, moribund royalty systems
in Germany and California.70 One problem with creating and main-
taining a fine arts agency is economic; as opponents of the royalty
point out, staff and maintenance costs for an agency would far ex-
ceed the amount of royalties collected and paid to artists.7 Aside
from the cost/benefit analysis, however, the creation of a fine arts
agency (or of a fine arts adjunct to the Copyright Office, as proposed
in the Visual Artists Rights Act) necessitates that the government
67. 15 CONG. REC. S12185 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1986) (statement of Senator Kennedy).
The quoted portion is attributed to President John F. Kennedy.
68. The Copyright Office would be empowered to establish a fine arts registration sys-
tem under S. 1619, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 3(e) and (f).
69. Hauser, supra note 4, at 9, explains the operation of the French agency, the Union
of Artistic Property.
70. Mclnerney, supra note 17, at 3.
71. Elsen, supra note 51, at 54.
VISUAL ARTISTS RIGHTS ACT
develop a definition of "work of fine art" to be applied to all works
submitted for resale royalty registration. The potential effects of this
governmental definition are far reaching, and are inconsistent with
statutory and common law copyright principles and with romantic
theory.
The subject matter of copyright law is outlined in section 102 of
the 1976 Copyright Act, and includes "original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later de-
veloped."" 2 In other words, any original work in whatever form, and
the originality requirement under the Act is easily met, qualifies for
copyright protection." Only ideas and useful articles (the latter of
which may qualify for patent protection) are positively outside the
scope of copyright.
74
The subject matter of copyright law includes "pictorial, graphic,
and sculptural works," and these are defined as "two-dimensional
and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photo-
graphs, prints, and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, technical
drawings, diagrams, and models."' 75 Although this definition recog-
nizes a difference between fine and applied art, no attempt is made
to explain what distinguishes one from the other. Accordingly, any
sort of pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work, whether or not "fine,"
qualifies for full copyright protection. Since the purpose of copyright
law is to encourage creative individuals to place their work before
the public and to reward those whose work captures public attention
and acclaim, the expansive scope of copyright law makes sense: the
government encourages creativity without determining merit. Justice
Holmes espoused this view in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic
Co.:
7 6
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained
only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth
of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvi-
ous limits. At the one extreme some works of genius would be
72. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1978).
73. The low level of originality required for copyright purposes is discussed in Bell &
Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951). There, the court stated,
Nothing in the Constitution commands that copyrighted matter be strik-
ingly unique or novel . . . . All that is needed to satisfy both the Constitution
and the statute is that the "author" contributed something more than a "merely
trivial" variation, something recognizably "his own." Originality in this context
"means little more than a prohibition of actual copying."
Id. at 102-03 (footnotes omitted).
74. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1978).
75. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1978).
76. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
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sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them
repulsive until the public had learned the new language in which
their author spoke. It may be more than doubted, for instance,
whether the etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet would
have been sure of protection when seen for the first time. At the
other end, copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed
to a public less educated than the judge. Yet, if they command
the interest of any public, they have a commercial value - it
would be bold to say that they have not an aesthetic and educa-
tional value - and the taste of any public is not to be treated
with contempt.
77
Unlike the general substantive provisions of the Copyright Act,
Senator Kennedy's royalty proposal reduces the scope of protection
from all pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works to an as yet unde-
fined subset of those works. In order to qualify for royalty coverage
under the proposed Bill, an artist would have to register his work
with the Copyright Office. However, the proposed Bill empowers the
Register of Copyrights to promulgate registration regulations
78
which would indicate who may qualify as an "artist" and what may
qualify as an "artwork" for purposes of the resale royalty.79
While the definitions of artist and artwork are unknown at pre-
sent, they would probably include works which are not yet of "recog-
nized stature" S0 but would exclude works made for hire."' One possi-
77. Id. at 251-52.
78. S. 1619, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(e).
79. S. 1619, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(f) limits resale royalty coverage to "artists."
80. The Visual Artists Rights Act defines "work of fine art" for purposes of the moral
right as "pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works of recognized stature." S. 1619, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess., § 2(3). This qualitative limitation on moral rights coverage is consistent with state
moral right statutes that also limit coverage to works of recognized quality. CAL. CIv. CODE §
987(b)(2) (Deering 1986); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 855(b) (West 1985); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 73, §§ 2101-10 (Purdon Supp. 1987). New York's "Artists Authorship Rights" stat-
ute does not have a quality limitation, but does limit coverage to works executed in traditional
media. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF LAW §§ 11.01, 14.03 (McKinney 1985).
The recognized quality criterion probably will not be applied to works offered for royalty
protection since, at the time of creation or first sale (i.e., the time when the artist applies for
royalty registration), an artwork's stature is unknown. A representative from Senator Ken-
nedy's office informed the author, however, that the royalty provisions are intended to apply
only to "works of fine art" as those works are defined in Section 2(3) of the Visual Artist's
Rights Act.
81. S. 1619, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8. The denial of coverage for works made for hire
seems to exclude motion pictures from inclusion in the Visual Artists Rights Act since motion
pictures are usually works made for hire and the original copyright owner or author is a studio.
This potential lack of protection for motion pictures is particularly disturbing with regard
to the moral rights aspect of Senator Kennedy's Bill. Arguably, the one area where moral
rights legislation is needed in the United States (assuming the desirability of such legislation)
is with regard to the colorization of black and white movies and cartoons. Surely, altering a
black and white print of The Maltese Falcon or one of Max Fleischer's original Popeyes is a
"significant or substantial distortion" of the work. Such alteration would not be subject to an
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ble effect of the definitions the Copyright Office would promulgate
could be to make absolute the distinction between high and low art;
between the artistic values of the avant garde or intellectual elite
and those of the general public.
In most cases, the Copyright Office could easily determine
whether a work qualified as fine art. Most works offered for registra-
tion would be easel paintings or sculptures of one sort or another.
Even if a work looked odd or seemed repugnant, the Copyright Of-
fice would register the work or, if registration was denied, a judge or
jury, after testimony from experts, would provide protection. If the
person who offered the work for registration called himself or herself
an artist and had the appropriate trappings - an art degree or re-
views of his or her work - registration would be obtained. At some
point, however, protection would be denied and the denial might turn
on whether the registrar, judge, or expert thought the submitted
work was fine art or craft.
What would happen, for instance, with the many examples of
woven cloth offered for sale at local art fairs? The design of the
cloth, consistent with the expansive protection of the Copyright Act,
is copyrightable. 82 If the cloth was purchased and later resold at a
price of more than $1000 and at a profit greater than 150 percent
(both requirements of the Visual Artists Rights Act), would the
weaver collect a seven percent royalty? Under the terms of Senator
Kennedy's Bill the answer is unclear since the cloth may not be con-
sidered an artwork. Although the cloth may contain some interesting
and creative elements, an art dealer or museum curator or other ex-
pert with whom the Register of Copyright consults, might reasona-
bly argue that the cloth is essentially utilitarian or that it is a work
which falls outside what is usually called "fine art." If not hand-
woven cloth, some other work will undoubtedly fail to qualify for
registration.8" The unregistered works will either be produced in the
injunction under section 3(c) of the Visual Artists Rights Act, however, since most motion
pictures are considered works made for hire.
The lack of protection for motion pictures further highlights the romantic underpinnings
of the Visual Artists Rights Act - the image of the artist as a lone and inspired genius. Thus,
both the moral right (section 3(b)(l)) and the resale royalty (section 3(d)(l)) are granted to
the artist as an individual and not to the copyright owner, possibly an individual, but poten-
tially several people or a corporation. Motion pictures are not the creations of people working
alone. Under the language of the Visual Artists Rights Act, it is difficult to determine just who
is the "artist" responsible for a motion picture. Perhaps our cultural heritage, which Senator
Kennedy's Bill seeks to promote, has already outpaced our legislators' vision in many of its
expressive forms.
82. Peter Pan Fabrics v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960).
83. Certain works offered to the Copyright Office as fine art objects must be denied
registration; otherwise, the royalty system would jam. For example, an economically motivated
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wrong medium, be insufficiently fine, or be priced too low. 84
Although the resale royalty will benefit only the few artists
whose works are resold at significant prices, the fine arts registration
system will potentially affect everyone. As the general public passes
through art fairs, for example, a registration mark or certificate
would identify some works as governmentally approved while other
works would bear no such stamp of approval. A registration mark
could be used to promote initial sales, rather than to collect resale
royalties; additionally, such marks might reinforce the idea that our
cultural heritage, which the Visual Artists Rights Act seeks to pro-
mote, is limited to museum-type objects executed in the traditional
fine arts media. Rather than benefit artists, the resale royalty would
let the government establish a certification mark for art.85
publisher might try to register all of its books as works of fine art and have its authors collect
royalties whenever books were resold at used book stores. Registration for mass market books
would easily be denied since these books clearly fall outside the scope of Senator Kennedy's
proposal. But consider small press, handmade books. Perhaps they are a sort of fine art sculp-
ture. Consider also academic press books with limited numbers of printings, handmade furni-
ture sold at craft fairs and purchased for aesthetic reasons; or the same furniture purchased
for utilitarian reasons. Handmade pottery and musical instruments are problematic as well.
The general point is that the Kennedy Bill's definition of fine art implies a fine art standard
which must be announced by the Copyright Office as it registers and rejects various copyright-
able objects.
84. The $1000, 150 percent requirements institutionalize the idea that fine art is for the
wealthy.
85. There was a period in American art history when certification marks - albeit pro-
vided by a private group - controlled and limited artistic expression in the United States. The
mark, "N.A." signified membership and the mark, "A.N.A." signified associate status in the
National Academy of Design (NAD) in New York. These marks were attached to the frames
of late nineteenth and early twentieth century paintings. At that time, there were few art
galleries in the United States and insufficient exhibition space to show the pieces of all working
artists. Gallery owners needed sales commissions to pay the rent and a show of an Academy
member's work was a guarantee of patronage. Charles C. Alexander explains:
With their controlled memberships and their jury method of determining
which members' works would be shown at exhibitions, the NAD and other city
academies maintained a high standard of professionalism . . . . Academy mem-
bers displayed an overriding conventionality in their opinions and their work.
The nudes they painted were ethereal, idealized and sedate; their landscapes
were idyllic; the murals they did for new public buildings depicted themes from
classical mythology and employed well-worn symbolism. Academy sculptors did
compositions that were deft, dignified, correct.
C. ALEXANDER, HERE THE COUNTRY LIES: NATIONALISM AND THE ARTS IN TWENTIETH CEN-
TURY AMERICA II (1980).
The irony is that early in this century, the Academy was trying to promote the same
American cultural heritage that the advocates of the resale royalty claim is so important. Yet,
few of the great Academy artists such as Kenyon Cox, Abbot Thayer, or John Alexander, are
remembered today, and few of their works are displayed in museums. The artists of this period
whom we now celebrate - Alfred Steiglitz, Arthur Dove, Joseph Stella, Robert Henri, John
Sloan, George Bellows - were, for the most part, ignored or rejected by the Academy (Henri
was a member of the NAD, but had little influence on Academy policies.). B. PERLMAN, supra
note 26, passim. Perhaps contemporaries do not always recognize the most talented of their
peers, and the propagation of official standards may hinder cultural development just as much
as it might promote that development.
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An additional consideration is the possibility that the present
tolerant artistic climate might change. What if early twentieth cen-
tury artistic values resurfaced and a piece such as Morton
Schamberg's dada sculpture, God, a sculpture constructed of ply-
wood and drain pipe and dedicated to the idea that what Americans
really worship is indoor plumbing,8 was offered for registration? Re-
gistration might be denied if the Register of Copyrights was of-
fended by the work; the Register might claim that a work such as
God is social commentary rather than art. The royalty provisions of
the Visual Artists Rights Act are intended to apply to every creative
endeavor and every copyrightable object, to private commissions as
well as private or public ones. The proposed Act would empower a
government official to determine which objects are of aesthetic or
cultural value. This grant of power would invite abuse since it allows
the government, represented by a small group of experts, to define
and limit the aesthetic agenda of both the art world and the general
public. Implementation of the royalty is, in effect, a reintroduction of
the hierarchy of genres.
The effect of the royalty on the general public would also be felt
in ways more subtle than through abusive denials of registration or
the presence of a registration or certification mark displayed in gal-
leries or in art fair booths. The development of a body of case law
defining the aesthetic guidelines for registration under the Act would
produce an institutionalized art criterion. Some artists might choose
to work within that criterion; others would consciously work against
it. In either event, the government would establish the art world's
agenda.
A resale royalty case arising in California, Robert H. Jacobs,
Inc. v. Westoak Realters, Inc.,81 has already expressed such an art
criterion. In Jacobs, the court held that "even if the inspiration that
produces an architect's plans may be ignited by the same creative
spark that inspires poetry or music," such plans are not fine art since
they are prepared in a commercial context. 8 This suggestion that
commercially inspired works are not fine art is also expressed in the
provision of the Visual Artists Rights Act which excludes works
made for hire from royalty protection. 89
A hypothetical demonstrates that the exclusion of works made
86. God is illustrated as fig. 52 in B. WOLF, MORTON LIVINGSTON SCHAMBERG (1963).
87. 159 Cal. App. 3d 637, 205 Cal. Rptr. 620 (1984).
88. Id. at 644, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 624.
89. S. 1619, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8.
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for hire makes little sense aesthetically. Suppose that a young artist
is hired by a book review to illustrate a series of articles about vari-
ous aspects of the Vietnam War. A contract is signed and the illus-
trations are classified as "works made for hire" 90 pursuant to Section
101 of the Copyright Act. After considering the commission for sev-
eral months and consulting prior representations of the horrors of
war, the artist produces a series of drawings that pleases the pub-
lisher, and that, when published, stir comment and visceral response
from the book review's readers. Years later, the artist becomes fa-
mous and is acclaimed as possessing psychological insight and the
ability to represent such insight through remarkable draftsmanship.
The book review loans the Vietnam War illustrations for display at a
retrospective exhibition where they receive much admiration, as de-
pictions of the horrors of war, not as illustrations of particular events
in Vietnam. The book review then sells the drawings for phenomenal
sums, the artist asks for his seven percent royalty, but the request is
denied. The illustrations were made for hire and, therefore, are not
fine art.
There is no reason why works made for hire should not qualify
for royalty protection unless such works are considered tainted or
unless the exclusion is necessary to prevent the royalty system from
growing unwieldy.91 In either event, the work made for hire exclu-
sion indicates the need for a governmental definition of artist and
artwork. As is exemplified by the Jacobs case and the hypothetical,
governmental definitions may have detrimental effects. They allow
the government, rather than the artist, to establish criteria for aes-
thetic worth. Contrary to romantic theory, which underlies the resale
royalty and emphasizes the primacy of the artist, implementation of
the royalty allows the government to set a standard that the artist
must meet.
V. Conclusion
Proponents of the resale royalty often note that the United
States lags behind Europe in cultural matters. France, for example,
90. Illustrations are explicitly included as supplementary works made for hire. 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1978).
91. One reason that works made for hire are excluded from protection under the Visual
Artists Rights Act may be that, under the Copyright Act, the initial author of such works is
the creator's employer, 17 U.S.C. § 201(b), and employers are not the intended beneficiaries of
Senator Kennedy's Bill. In order to provide the creators of works made for hire with resale
royalty and moral right protection, another layer of bureaucratic bookkeeping would be added
to the copyright registration procedure: in addition to authors or initial copyright owners, the
Register of Copyrights would have to define and keep track of creators of works made for hire.
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was the birthplace of most important developments in post-Renais-
sance art and has had a resale royalty for sixty years. Proponents of
the royalty fail to recognize, however, that European governments
have been intimately involved in their countries' art affairs since at
least the seventeenth century. Not only were educational support and
exhibition space provided, but through the hierarchy of genres the
content of visual artworks was regulated as well.92 Indeed, the ro-
mantic model advocated by proponents of the resale royalty devel-
oped, in part, as a reaction to governmental interference with the art
world.' 8 Ironically, in the search for a workable definition of fine art,
proponents of the resale royalty institutionalize romanticism and
construct the sort of governmental restraint that modern artists have
traditionally opposed.
Rather than enhance our cultural heritage, a resale royalty
would merely establish a governmental standard for fine art. Such a
standard invites abuse, both in the denial of registration to worth-
while works and in the fosterage of a high art/low art distinction. A
more effective way to enhance America's artistic heritage is to let
the art world develop as artist and public desire, without excessive
governmental interference.
The Visual Artists Rights Act may well suffer the same fate as
most other resale royalty proposals and die in committee without
much legislative comment. Proponents of the resale royalty, however,
likely will continue their attempts to enact some sort of legislation;
periodically, another article appears and decries the almost philistine
lack of art support legislation in the United States. However, prior to
enactment of any resale royalty, proponents of the royalty should
articulate the nature of the aesthetic model that underscores their
proposed legislation, and explain whether that model is an appropri-
ate one for our time. Additionally, proponents of the royalty must
explain why it is proper for the government to take an aesthetic
stand, to impose its view of art on the general public, whether or not
government funded projects are involved.
A number of resale royalty measures have been proposed in the
United States in the last several years and, inevitably, each of these
proposals would establish a fine arts criterion. Despite the good faith
of the proposers, each of the criteria inhibit the romantic, self-gener-
ative view of art which prompted the resale royalty in the first place.
92. P. CONISBEE, supra note 30, discusses the relationship between French art and the
French government in the introductory chapter.
93. See M.H. ABRAMS, supra note 22, passim.
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In light of this inescapable inhibition, and the small resale market,
any resale royalty proposal would best be discarded.
